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Abstract 
Though the idea of tradable permit system has been put into practice for many years in China, the development is 
rather slow. The success in achieving SO2 emission reduction target in the power industry during the 11th five year 
plan period was due to the strict enforcement of the total emission control method, not the application of tradable 
permit system. In this article, based on the evidence from the pilot projects, the author analyzed the reasons for the 
slowness in the development of tradable permit system and drawn to the conclusion that tradable permit system 
would not replace the command and control instrument in the near future. 
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1. Introduction 
The rapid g rowth of the Chinese economic has called for greater demand of power, lead ing to an 
expansion of the power generating capacity. By  the end of 2009, the power generating capacity  for the 
whole country has amounted to 87409 thousand Kwh, an increase of 10.26%. Of this total capacity, 
74.5% comes from coal power [1]. The expansion of the industry is accompanied by the increase of SO2 
emission. As a result, the country found it fail to meet the reduction target during the 10th five-year p lan 
period (2000-2005), and had to readjust its SO2 emission target for the 11th    five-year plan period (2006-
2010) [2].Thanks to the strict enforcement of the controls, especially those exerted in the power industry, 
total SO2 emission has reduced by 13.14% by the end of 2009, achieving the goal ahead of t ime. 
Reduction of SO2 emission in the power industry amounted to 29.3%, a great performance. However, 
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command and control is not always successful, as to the goal of energy conservation set by the 11th Five 
Year Plan, many provinces find it hard  to achieve. As the end of 2010 is approaching, some provinces 
dramat ically cut down or rat ion its power supply, an opportunism action that is vastly blamed for. Though 
the Chinese environmental protection bureau has set up roadmap of market based instrument for 
environmental conservation ever sine 2008, it seems that it  is the command and control instrument that is 
prevalent, not the market based ones. 
In theory, the tradable permit system is a market bas ed instrument that will min imize the aggregate cost 
of achieving a given level of environmental protection [3]. The cap and trade system for the control of 
SO2 was introduced in the US in 1995, a system which authorizes a utility or industrial source to emit one 
ton of SO2 during a given year or any year there after. Allowances may be traded after in itial allocation, 
but at the end of each year, the source must hold an amount of allowances at least equal to its annual 
emissions. In this way, total SO2 emission was set at its cap. Th is trading system was so successful that it  
had reduced the total emission at a cost effective way. Many authors have discussed the lessons from the 
US experience from different perspectives and summarized the key features of the systems as flexible, 
simplicity and strict enforcement [4-5].In China, Many authors tried to give suggestion on policy making 
from the US experience [6-8]. Some authors discussed the possibilities of having such system in  the 
control of SO2 in the power industry, or gave suggestions on its application in China [9-10]. Some authors 
have discussed the experience of some pilot projects. Yet a few express ed their concerns for the system. 
Miao and Jiang described the difficult ies faced in the pilot project in th e SO2 trad ing system in  
Jiangsu[11], Liu d iscussed the dilemma of the tradable permits systems in China[12],While Zhu stated 
that the tradable permit system in the power industry for control of SO2 is hard to push forward, due to 
drawbacks in the current system[13].   
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, the author discusses the development of the SO2 tradable 
permits system in China, based on the evidence of three typical transactions in the pilot project in Jiangsu, 
and then reasons for the slow progress are analyzed. Finally, the author draws to the conclusions. 
2. Development of the tradable permits system in China 
There are various law and regulation regarding the control of SO2 and emission reduction at the 
national level, such as the amendment of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law in 2000, the 
pollution charge system in 2003, the Standards of Emission of pollutants of thermo power p lants in 2003. 
The idea of tradable permits was introduced in 1989, when a provincial legislation, the Ad ministrative 
method for the total emission control system of Tai yuan city, clearly stated that the emission allowances 
under cap can be traded. The pilot project  of t radable permit  system in  China is based on the pollution 
permits system and the total emission control system, two command and control instrument. In 1999, 
cooperated with the US EPA, a project aimed at reducing SO2 emission with market based instrument in 
the power industry was carried  out in  two cities,Nantong, and Benxi. But practice of such system was not 
expanded until the national environmental protection agency (NEPA) gave a notice in 2003, calling for 
research on policy o f tradable emission permits and areas of p ilot p rojects to be expanded. The first 
national wide p ilot projects were carried out in four provinces, four cities and one Group Company under 
the ordinance of the NEPA. In 2010, a draft of tradable permit system in the power industry was also 
under way, but the final has not been released yet. From the year of 2001 to 2009, several transactions of 
SO2 tradable permits were completed. Among them, three types of transactions were typical. Details of 
these three transactions are given in Table 1. 
Table 1. Comparisons of the three typical transactions in Jiangsu Pilot Project 
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 1 2 3 
Buyer Nantong Polytech Company* Taichang Port E&P power 
company 
Taixing Xinpu 
Chemical  Ltd. 
Seller Nantong tiansheng port power 
company 
Xiaguan power plants of 
Nanjing 
Taixing EPA 
Volume of trading 300 ton per year for six years 1700ton per year, for two year 200ton 
Price of Permits 250/ton 1000/ton  1500/ton 
Location of the 
participants  
Nantong city Nanjing,taichang Port Taixing city 
Time of transaction 2001.12 2003.7 2007.11 
In the first transaction, the seller transferred 1800 tons of the permits to the buyer in six years (300 
each year), after that, the permits will return to the seller. In fact, the right was transferred temporary. Yet  
it was the first transaction in China. Th is transaction marked the beginning of the pilot project and pushed 
the expansion of the pilot project areas to national wide. The second one was the first Trans regional 
transaction and was deemed as a landmark for the practice of the trading system. In the third one, the 
municipal EPA bought the savings from two companies and then sold them to the buyer, acting as a dealer. 
Some common features of these transactions can be observed: prices of trading increase dramatically over 
the years; most of the sellers were current emitters or old power plants, while most of the buy ers were new 
emitters. New emitters needed the permits in order to get approval to go into operation, not to save the 
pollution control cost. Most of the transactions were in itiated with the help of the local EPA, rather than 
voluntary. In other project areas, things are quite similar. There is huge demand for tradable permits, yet 
supply is little , trad ing volume is not large and the market is inactive.  So the progress of the SO2 tradable 
system is quite slow.   
3. Reasons for slow progress of tradable permits 
3.1. Command and control is dominant, leaving little room for business to choose  
The key feature of the cap and trade system is that the sources, who best understand their operation 
and business, have the flexibility to choose compliance alternatives in  terms of timing  and technology. 
Emitter can choose to use low sulfur coals, try scrubbers or to buy permit. However, within the current 
framework, there are few alternatives for emitters to choose. As required by the national law, the total 
targets of both emission and reduction of the whole country is determined by the NEPA, which later 
designates these targets to different provinces, and then the later designate the targets to different cities 
and counties. The deadline of reduction is also predetermined. To  implement and enforce this policy, 
environmental p rotection bureaus at different levels of governments usually mandate the new emitter to 
set up scrubber equipment before giv ing it approval to operate, while the current emitters are also 
required to set up scrubber equipment before a predetermined deadline. The governments prescribe the 
maximum amount of pollution that indiv idual sources can emit, and only a few technologies for emission 
reduction are allowed. The emitters have no choice in the timing and technology used. The rig idness in 
the designation of the emission targets is in conflict with the flexibility imbedded in the trading system. 
The success in achieving the SO2 reduction target for the 11th   five year p lan period with the command 
and control instrument further enforces the reliance on that instrument. 
3.2. Cost of SO2 reduction for business is similar under current system  
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The philosophy of tradable permit is that when emitter with higher control cost of pollution control 
will choose to buy permits from emitters with lower control cost, the former will have greater emission 
while the latter will have less emission, but total emission will remain unchanged. But in practice things 
are quite different. As requirements for pollution control are simila r, there is little difference in the cost of 
pollution control. This makes the motives for trading qu ite different from the original design. Most of the 
buyers are new emitters, which have much investment in scrubber as required by the law. New emitters 
must have a certain amount of permits before the government gives them approval to operate. So the 
demand for a permit comes from the need to get approval, rather than a trade off between the price of the 
permit  and the cost of pollution  control. The sellers  are old  emitters, which due to historical reasons have 
spent too little  on pollution control. To  them the cost of renovation will be too high. Most of them refrain 
from spending on scrubbers; as a result not too many old  emitters have ext ra permits. Even when emitters 
have extra permits, they will rather hold it at hand, to insure against risk of non -compliance. As there is 
great demand for power, and the total emission allowance is bound to decrease, many emitters wish to 
hold the permits for its own expansion for the future, expecting an increase in the price. In addit ion to that, 
by keeping the permits rather than selling it to new emitter, a barrier to entry is build. So in spite of the 
great demand from new emitters, the supply is not enough. 
3.3. Complexity in the transaction procedure increases the cost and risk of transaction  
In the trading of the permits, transaction cost cannot be ignored. Usually, both parties shall pay to get 
the information about demand and supply, allowance, permits and so on. The p rocess of negotiation will 
incur cost for both parities too. The local EPA, who act as a monitor will incur cost too. If the procedure 
is too complex, efficiency will be lowered. In the pilot project, to complete a transaction, a procedure of 
application, negotiation, review, transfer, register and verification will be covered. A feasibility report by 
a third party should be prepared, and review by the local governments will be needed. Even when both 
parties agree on the price and other details of the deal, an approval from the government must be 
necessary. This procedure increases the cost and uncertainty of the deal.  
3.4. Free initial allocations without expiration discourage emitter to try pollution control methods  
As to the initial allocation of permits, fo r many years, it  was free. It was not until 2008 did the Jiangsu 
EPA charge for allowance, and in Shangxi province, charg ing for allowance began in 2010.By g iving 
initial allowances free, the government gives a subsidy to current emitter (o ld emitters), wh ich will help 
to ease the resistance from them. Current emitters with a long history have not enough investment on 
environmental protection and technology transformat ion, the cost of compliance will usually be higher 
then that of new emitters. Free allocation to current emitter puts them in a better position in competing 
with the new emitters. Because new emitters or new projects should pay a charge for permits or buy 
permits from the current emitters. In  fact, this favor can already be seen in the regulated prices of powers 
sold to the grid, where the government uses differential rates for old and new power plants, and for p lants 
with and without scrubbers. There are obvious political advantages of allocating permits without charge, 
but it also makes free a llocations problemat ic [14]. As time goes by, the disadvantage of the current 
emitters in  pollution control will vanish and such subsidy have a side effect  by giv ing current emitters 
permanent rights to pollute, rather than encouraging them to try  innovation in pollution control. So the 
current emitters have little incentive to give up such rights . 
4. Conclusions 
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Though the feasibility and the benefits of tradable permit system in control of SO2 have been proved, 
and the pilot pro jects have been carried out in several areas for years, the progress in China is quite slow. 
The success in reducing SO2 emission during the 11th five year plan period is mainly due to the strict 
enforcement of command and control instrument, not the tradable permits system. The reasons for the 
slow progress in the development of tradable permits system mainly  lies in the conflict  between the 
current command and control system and the market based system. As the current system is unlikely to 
change in the near future, the tradable permit system is not likely to replace the command and control 
system recently. There is still a long way for the market based instrument to succeed in China  
Acknowledgements 
The author thanks the Ministry of Education of China for its support of the project t itled: valued based 
industrial waste cost management˄08JC630070˅.  
References 
[1] China Electricity Council, Statistics of the power industry in 2009. available at http://www.cec.org.cn/html/deptnews/2010/7/ 
16/20107161439168390.html (in Chinese) 
[2] State Council,The Five-year plan for environment protection, The State council of China. 2007 (in Chinese) 
[3] J. H.Dales, Pollution,Property, and Prices. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968 
[4] R.N.Starvins, What can we learn from the grand policy experiment, lessons from SO2 allowance trading,Journal of 
Economic Perspectives.12. 3(1998),p 69~88 
[5] S.Napolitano, S.Jeremy, S .Gabrielle , and W.Maggie, The U.S. acid rain program: Key insights from the design, operation, 
and assessment of a cap-and-trade program,The Electricity Journal. 20 .7(2007), p47~58 
[6] J.Wu and Z. Ma, Allowance trading policy of pollutant discharged in U.S.A and Its inspiring to China, environment 
protection. 8(2004), p.59~64(in Chinese) 
[7] L.Luo, The US tradable permit system and its implication to China,Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology (Social science 
edition). Vol 6.1(2004),p61~64,68(in Chinese) 
[8] H.Fang and Z.Ma, The enlightenment of American SO2 emission trading to China,Journal of Nanchang University. 39(2008), 
p72~76( in Chinese) 
[9] Q.L.Zhang, Research on power enterprise emission trading, Master thesis, Northeast Electricity University,2008.(in Chinese) 
[10] Y.Zhuang, L.P.Jiang, li. Ma, and R.Fu, Discussion on the problems of trading of SO2 permits in the coal fired power plants 
in China,Chinese Energy. 30 .12(2008), p21~24(in Chinese) 
[11] J.Miao, Difficulties of SO2 tradable permit system in Jiangsu,environmental economics. 10(2008), p19~23(in Chinese) 
[12] J.H.Liu, The Chinese Delimma of SO2 tradable permit system, Decision.1(2006), p30 3̚1(in Chinese) 
[13] X.R.Zhu, SO2 tradable permit system in the power industry hard to push forward. Chinese energy news.  August 30,2010, 
p.18(in Chinese) 
[14] R.N.Starvins, Lessons Learned from SO2 Allowance Trading,Choice. 20. 1(2005)p53~57 
